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ON THE ETHICS OF
LAWYERS
PETER J. RIGA*
The fact of the matter is that law school education-and the fashionable, tax
deductible, post admission education programs frequently held in plush
places-cannot teach wisdom, or experience, or judgment, or dedication, or
even morality. And it is essentially from deficiencies in these areas that the
profession suffers. I
This fundamental complaint against lawyers is far and away the most
serious in the eyes of the general public. For if this moral sense is missing,
then the rest of the legal profession's code of ethics becomes a dead letter,
for the spirit is gone. While this is important for any system of ethics, it is
particularly so for a group of people whoseprofessed objective in life is
"justice under law." It is extremely important for jurists and lawyers not
only that justice under law actually be done, but that it seem to be done
as well.!
It is important to note that when discussing legal ethics, justice and
law are always in tandem. They are as interrelated as man and woman; to
attempt to understand one without the other is always disastrous. One
cannot be intellectually, morally, or psychologically understood without
the other. The history of legal thought is strewn with those who have
attempted to do so, from the moralistic canonists and Calvinists who
burned their adversaries without a scintilla of due process, to the Austin's
and Holmes' whose juridical positivism emptied the law of its moral con-
tent and substituted the concept of force and power in its stead. In the final
analysis, the relationship between law and justice is the problem of legal
ethics. It is seldom even alluded to in legal education, and yet, after the
Watergate scandal, this question eats at the entrails of the legal profession.
We cannot give more here than passing reference to that ancient yet
still relevant question of whether our courts are tribunals of law or of
justice. Historically, the dispute originates in the common law distinction
between the courts of law and the Chancellor's court of equity.3 The dis-
* Ph.L., 1954, M.A. 1960, Louvain University, Belgium; M.S., 1961, Catholic University of
America; M.A., 1965, State University of New York at Buffalo; Ph.D., 1973, Graduate Theo-
logical Union, Berkeley, California; J.D., 1976, University of San Fransisco.
Kurland, Polishing the Bar, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1975, at 35, col. 1.
2 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 9-6, wherein it is stated: "Every lawyer
owes a solemn duty . .. to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance
of impropriety."
I The equity courts accepted petitions wherein it was alleged that the law courts lacked
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tinction was clumsy, but it did serve to highlight the essential problem of
law and justice in the minds of lawyers. In the United States, this distinc-
tion became blurred and finally obliterated so that today lawyers never
bother to ask the question, let alone be disturbed by it.' In three years of
law school, this author heard not one professor or student even allude to
the subject.
What is clear in the history of the common law during the past seven
hundred years is that the freedom of man has its roots in the medieval
notion of the homo liber et legalis, the man whose freedom was the age-
old custom in which the nature of men expressed itself, and whose lawful
freedoms were guaranteed by law and possessed in association with his
fellows. The lawyer was always an essential catalyst in this whole legal
process, 5 but one who at the same time betrayed the ongoing dynamic
relationship between law and justice by establishing and perpetuating the
conservative nature of every legal structure. It was not without truth that
Shakespeare observed that in any revolution, the first thing to do is kill
all the lawyers.' Perhaps. But, one thing that certainly cannot be done is
to discuss legal ethics without examining this profound issue.
The American legal system is the product of a whole, known as the
adversary system, whose supposed virtue is the attainment of justice by a
truth-seeking method which places adverse parties before an impartial
tribunal. This is no mean feat since the adversary system is a compara-
tively recent invention of jurisprudence, arising in the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion and extensively developed only since the 17th century. Of particular
significance is that this adversary system was the conscious choice of a
people who came to recognize its necessity, not from the teachings of
theoreticians, but from the bloody pages of a history where tyranny and
oppression abound infinitely more than justice and due process. The
jurisdiction, the King's property interests were involved, the law courts were powerless to
enforce their decision, and the common law remedy was either inadequate or nonexistent. G.
KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQurrY 19-20 (4th ed. 1956). For a thorough discussion of the
division between law and equity in England, see 4 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 278-85 (2d ed. 1937).
1 At the beginning of this century, Professor Maitland predicted a time "when lawyers will
cease to inquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity or a rule of the common law: suffice
it that it is a well-established rule administered by the High Court of Justice." F. MAITLAND,
EQurry AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 20 (1909).
The distinction between law and equity was abandoned in the federal courts in 1938 by
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Crv. P. 1. Most states
have also abolished the distinction between law and equity in their courts. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-1 (West 1952); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 103(a) (McKinney 1972). Although
New York statutory law had abolished the distinction between law and equity in 1848, the
courts to some extent still adhered to the differentiation as late as 1949. See Kharas, A
Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 186 (1949); Note, Law and
Equity in New York-Still Unmerged, 55 YALE L.J. 826 (1946).
See generally J. BOWLE, WESTERN POLrrIcAL THOUGHT (1947).
W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, PART 2, Act IV, Scene 2.
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Magna Carta originally might have been the affair of the barons and King
John, but its effect on history was the beginning of limitations on power
by means of law as a control on tyranny. The implications of that revolu-
tion unfolded in the history of the common law.
All this is by way of introduction to a specific question of the ethics
of particularity. Since, according to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
essence of any trial is "that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined," 7 the relationship between justice and the truth-seeking
process becomes vital in their relationship to law. To speak more bluntly,
what rule of solid ethics permits a lawyer in the American adversary sys-
tem to put on the stand a client whom he knows will perjure himself, or to
attack the credibility of a witness he knows to be telling the truth or, even
worse, to serve as advocate for a defendant who the lawyer knows to be
guilty of the crime charged? This last situation is particularly agonizing
for a conscientious lawyer because of the added danger that such a de-
fendant may subsequently cause further harm to innocent persons if re-
leased through the lawyer's efforts.
It does not help to protest that the lawyer does not serve as judge and
jury, since everyone judges and weighs every significant action he does
against some value which he considers important, more important, most
important, or, in the negative, insignificant. Nor does it help very much
for a lawyer to say "I don't want to know" the truth in these examples,
since that would be an abdication of responsibility to himself as a conscien-
tious human being. Of course, if the lawyer's objective is money, prestige
from winning cases, or the like, then his whole value system is perverted,
and justice suffers immensely from such technicians of the trade. Such
charlatans adopt the cynical definition of the lawyer as one who defends
the poor, the orphan, and the widow unless, of course, he is attacking the
poor, the orphan, and the widow, but the question remains for the consci-
entious lawyer. Once again, apparently the only answer is an historical
one. Due process, both substantive and procedural, the rule of law, and
similar basic principles were born of history and not of theory; men finally
saw that trial by ordeal or by torture availed nothing as to truth and
justice. So they tried a different route, that of rules to protect against
unfairness, to guarantee rights, to find truth insofar as human truth can
be found at all. This honing process took centuries and, indeed, it is still
not complete. It provides a far better instrument, however, than that which
mankind formerly had. It is the exalted function of lawyers in our society
to perfect this instrument as much as possible, not to destroy it. To do
otherwise would be to destroy the fragile safeguard of freedom.
The adversary system of truthfinding is not perfect by any means. It
neither guarantees that all who are guilty will be punished nor ensures that
all who are innocent will be exonerated. On the whole, however, the adver-
I FED. R. EVID. 102.
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sary system is a far better protection for the dignity of the human person
than any other means mankind has devised. For this reason alone, as the
lesser of two evils, the lawyer may defend those who he knows to be guilty
or to try to discredit those who he knows to be telling the truth. This is an
uneasy answer, one sure to be rejected by the purists in our midst. But, it
is a reason with which a lawyer can live in good conscience and with
integrity.
The significance of the relationship between law and justice as an
essential contributing factor to the ethical norm of the lawyer can also be
seen in the honesty demanded of him in and by the court. This is reflected
directly in the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
require an attorney to make full disclosure to the court of any legal author-
ity adverse to his client's position unless opposing counsel has already done
so.8 The difficulty here is not only that knowing failure to reveal a control-
ling case is an act of dishonesty to the court, but also that such an omission
constitutes a failure of a sense of fair play where it is justice and truth
which are sought. This situation is to be distinguished from a failure to
disclose a fact, such as the existence of a witness whose testimony the
attorney knows to be relevant and material. The authorities generally
agree that an attorney has no ethical duty to reveal in the latter situations,,
I See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, DR 7-106 (B)(1) which states: "In present-
ing a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose: (1) Legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to him to be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not
disclosed by opposing counsel." The rationale underlying this ethical requirement is ex-
pressed in id., EC 7-23:
The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless
the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully
informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination
of the matter before it. The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will
present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client. Where a
lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse to the
position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its existence unless his adversary
has done so; but, having made such disclosure, he may challenge its soundness in whole
or in part.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 146 (1935) reads in part:
We are of the opinion that this Canon requires the lawyer to disclose . . . decisions
[that are adverse to his client's interests] to the court. He may, of course, after doing
so, challenge the soundness of the decisions or present reasons which he believes would
warrant the court in not following them in the pending case.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 280 (1949) discusses the prior Opinion
No. 146 and concludes that:
The test in every case should be: Is the decision which opposing counsel has overlooked
one which the court should clearly consider in deciding the case? Would a reasonable
judge properly feel that a lawyer who advanced, as the law, a proposition adverse to
the undisclosed decision, was lacking in candor and fairness to him? Might the judge
consider himself misled by an implied representation that the lawyer knew of no
adverse authority?
See, e.g., note 31 and accompanying text infra.
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while they are divided with respect to the prior. But, does the lawyer, in
fact, have a moral obligation to reveal in both instances?
The first thing to determine is whether a civil or a criminal case is
involved. This distinction is not irrelevant; indeed, it is quite important
to the disposition of the case. The object of any civil proceeding is the clear
establishment of the truth so that maximum justice-or perhaps simply
the modicum justitiae, as the medieval canonists used to phrase it-will
be brought about in a particular case. Although this is certainly true in a
criminal case as well, there exists one important distinction: the truth in
a criminal case occupies a secondary role to the prosecution's burden of
proving the accused's guilt. In the words of a prominent American crimi-
nologist: "The criminal defense lawyer must understand that the criminal
trial as we know it in the Anglo-American system, is not so much a search
for truth, but rather the occasion for the prosecution to prove the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 10
Even in a criminal case, however, if lawyers are seeking the truth there
must be an interrelationship between law and justice or there is no way to
escape the rank cynicism that it is not so much the quality of the case but
a knowledge of the mores, attitude, and goodwill of the judge and jury
which finally determines the outcome of a particular case. While one ought
not to be naive in thinking that such factors do not influence a judge or
jury, it is submitted that to surrender to such a mentality in order to be
''realistic" is to destroy the spirit of the code of ethics as well as to mutilate
the lawyer's sense of integrity.
In both situations described above, it is fair to say that the defense is
entitled under our juridical system to put the prosecution to the test of its
proof. It is self-evident that a trial is, in some way, a discovery of truth for
the ends of justice, and thus the adversary parties are bound by "all fair
and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land
permits, to the end that no person be deprived of life or liberty, but by due
process of law."" In the words of the Supreme Court, "guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer."'" Although such "honorable means" would at
the very least require revelation of a possibly controlling court decision,
this same obligation does not necessarily require disclosure of the existence
of a witness. The dilemma was stated well by Dean Freedman:
The lawyer is an officer of the court, participating in a search for truth. Yet
no lawyer would consider that he had acted unethically in pleading the
statute of frauds or the statute of limitations as a bar to a just claim. Simi-
larly, no lawyer would consider it unethical to prevent the introduction of
evidence ... seized in violation of the fourth amendment or a truthful but
involuntary confession, or to defend a guilty man on grounds of denial of a
speedy trial. Such actions are permissible because there are policy considera-
,0 Starrs, Professional Responsibility: Three Basic Propositions, 5 Am. Cm. L.Q. 17 (1966).
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 5.
I? Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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tions that at times justify frustrating the search for truth and the prosecution
of a just claim.' 3
The term "policy considerations" understates the importance of the basic
safeguards of human dignity, inferiority, integrity, and self-possessiveness.
As mentioned earlier, the American consensus on the adversary system was
the product of historical experience, a reaction against a system of the
King's justice which obtained truth by torture, self-incrimination, and
dictatorial power. To safeguard human dignity and rights, the burden of
proof has been placed not on the defendant but on the prosecution in
criminal cases and on the plaintiff in civil cases. It is for them to plead
and prove by the necessary quantum of evidence.
This system represents a value choice in history, ratified by each
succeeding generation which adheres to it, perfects it, and uses it. The
lawyer is essentially and by oath dedicated par excellence to the further-
ance and perfection of this truth-seeking process by procedural rules for
the purpose of justice in an adversary system before an impartial tribunal.
Defense counsel must fight vigorously, but he must always do so within the
framework of the prescribed standards of conduct. "He owes loyalty to his
client-no doubt-but he cannot be disloyal to the profession. All lawyers
must remember that the basic purpose of the trial is the determination of
truth."'4 Truth, however, is not the end but is rather the means ad justi-
tiar faciendam, which is the fundamental virtue of the city.
This is why it is so important for a lawyer to understand the virtue of
justice as recognized by the ancient authors Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle.
For them, the climate of the civitas is distinctive. It is not feral or familial,
but forensic. It is not hot and humid like the climate of the animal king-
dom. It lacks the cordial warmth of love and unreasoning loyalty that
pervades the family. It is cool and dry, with the coolness and dryness that
characterize good argument among informed and reasonable men. Civic
amity gives to this climate its vital quality. Ideally, there should be but
one passion in the city-the passion for justice. But the will to justice,
though it engages the heart, finds it measure, as it finds its origin, in in-
telligence, in a clear understanding of what is due to the equal citizen from
the city and to the city from the citizenry according to the mode of their
equality. This unity, qualified by amity, is the highest good of the civic
multitude and the perfection of its civility. That is why it is so important
for lawyers to be utterly ethical, to possess a passionate scrupulosity for
truthfulness for the ends of justice. This is, as Mr. Kurland has suggested,
much more a basic moral sense than an ethical code. 5 The code, in fact,
presupposes this moral sense as matter to form."
11 Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1482 (1966).
" Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense Function: An Attorney's
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 23, 24 (1966).
Kurland, Polishing the Bar, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1975, at 35, col. 1.
" Cf. J. MURiRAY, WE HoLD THESE TRUTHs, 79-95 (1960). There the author describes the need
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It is within this context that the whole American adversary system
begins to make some rather profound sense. As suggested earlier, what is
important is to conserve this system of justice while seeking to prevent its
more profound abuses. In other words, to the greatest possible degree, the
adversary system serves to protect a system of historical choice by a whole
people. It is a system which best guarantees the rights and dignity of the
person, or at least, as a people, we believe that it does so. At the bottom
of Dean Freedman's "policy considerations"" is this basic belief of each
and every lawyer who takes an oath to uphold and defend the Constitu-
tion-the primary rule'-of the United States. Without this fundamental
dedication to truth and justice as expressed in the history of the common
law, the lawyer is at odds with the system itself.
All this does not as yet answer the ethical dilemma of the lawyer who
is aware of a witness unknown to his adversary. But the discussion thus
far does serve to lay the moral groundwork which will provide the outlines
of a solution to the problem. Certainly, to lie to the court is a destruction
of the entire system, and the lawyer is under a firm and absolute duty
never to lie to the court."5 But, on occasion it may be the attorney's duty
not to speak 0 if he is to conserve and protect the essence of the adversary
system. This was clearly shown in a case narrated by the eminent jurist
Samuel Williston." He tells of a client who was sued over a financial
matter. In preparing for trial, Williston obtained his client's letter file. At
trial, the plaintiff's lawyer did not demand production of the correspond-
ence, and Williston did not feel bound to disclose the letters. The case
for a public philosophy of morality in the United States. He bases this philosophy upon
universal truths which guarantee mankind certain immunities and powers, and applies it to
foreign policy.
'7 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
Cf. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961). Primary rules are the basic obligations
and rights of individuals as defined by a cohesive society. They are the bases of the society,
without which social organization would fail. As a social structure becomes increasingly
complex, these rules must become more clearly defined while maintaining their authority and
adaptability to social change.
" This Article does not consider the ethical problem of the lawyer who allows a client to
testify after the client has told the lawyer of his intention to perjure himself in court. For a
full discussion of this area, see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27-
42 (1975). Dean Freedman states that it would be a breach of lawyer-client confidentiality to
inform the court of the client's perjury or to allow the client to give perjured testimony. He
also believes that the client may be deprived of adequate counsel and a fair trial if his
attorney, upon learning of the perjured testimony, either withdraws from the case or omits
reference to it in his summation. Id. at 33-34. Although it is contrary to the principles set
forth in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Freedman concludes that most lawyers
would knowingly treat the perjured testimony of their client in the same manner as they
would any other favorable testimony. Id. at 40-41.
21 The distinction between omission and commission, which is even today widely debated in
legal circles, was discussed long ago. See ARISTOTLE, NIcOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book VII, chs. 6,
8; T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Ia. 8, 3 ad 2-3.
2 S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 270-71 (1940).
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resulted in a verdict for the defendant." The deciding judge based his
decision, inter alia, on a presumed "fact" which Williston knew to be
unfounded," for he was in possession of a letter which contradicted this
"fact." 2' While Williston was aware that he had no ethical duty to disclose
this crucial piece of evidence, he felt "somewhat uncomfortable at the
time." 21 It has been suggested that
Mr. Williston clearly saw the evil of an advocate voluntarily giving up a
position tenable under the law and to the interest of his client. This is not to
say that he thought that the system was perfect, but he clearly saw the force
of the primary obligation to the client to represent him fully within the legal
framework of the American adversary system."
This letter was evidence of a matter of fact to be proven by the plaintiff
in an adversary system. The defense attorney was not morally obligated
to inform the plaintiff of the existence of this evidence since it is the
plaintiff who bears the burden of proof as it is he who seeks relief. Thus,
an attorney is under no positive obligation to aid the opposing counsel
with his case in discovery.
The question as to the obligation of counsel to inform the court of some
precedent affecting the case should be answered in the affirmative. An
attorney, even if he argues the inapplicability of a precedent to the facts
at bar, has a definite moral-ethical obligation to reveal its existence to the
judge, for otherwise the system itself is subverted. In this respect, a quote
from Lord Birkenhead is in point:
Their Lordships were therefore very much in the hands of counsel and those
who instructed counsel in these matters, and the House expected, and indeed
insisted, that authorities which bear one way or the other upon matters under
debate should be brought to the attention of their Lordships by those who
are aware of those authorities. That observation was irrespective of whether
or not the particular authority assisted the party who was aware of it. It was
an obligation of confidence between their Lordships and all those who as-
sisted in the debates in this house in the capacity of counselY7




21 Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. Rxv. 575 (1961). Professor Thode
raised the more difficult question of whether Williston would have been able to ethically
remain silent if the judge had asked whether either attorney had information concerning the
particular issue to which the undisclosed letter in Williston's possession related. Id. at 588.
According to the professor, the answer would turn on "whether the court's question was
reasonably within the scope of its power to control and direct the trial .... " Id. If such
power exists, then the law would require the attorney to divulge the pertinent information.
Id. If on the other hand, the court lacked the authority to direct such disclosure, the attorney
should remain silent. Id. However, Professor Thode, as well as this author, remains uneasy
with this solution since the court thereby seemingly violates the "internal morality" of its
own system. See id. See also C. CURTrS, IT'S YOUR LAw 13 (1954).
" Glebe Sugar Ref. Co. v. Trustees of Port and Harbours, [1921] 37 T.L.R. 436 (H.L.)
(Scot.).
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The Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion has declared that a lawyer has the duty to advise the court of judicial
"decisions adverse to his client's contentions." The committee stated
that "a lawyer is an officer of the court. His obligations to the public are
no less significant than his obligation to his client. It is his duty to aid the
court in the due administration of justice."29 This canon expresses the
basic thesis of this Article; namely, that the end of the judicial process is
justice under law by means of truthfinding under safeguarding rules, not
trickery and procedural obfuscation. As Charles P. Curtis has properly
expressed it: "The court has priority over the client in matters of law and
the client has a priority over the court in matters of fact." 0 Although
Curtis bases this distinction on a matter of loyalties, it can better be
justified as a defense of the very system of common law in adversary
advocacy.3
In conclusion, it may be stated that a defendant's lawyer need not
reveal the name of a witness or document known to him, but unknown by
the court or the plaintiff, and he does not act unethically in keeping si-
lent.3" The plaintiff is put to his burden of persuasion. This case falls within
the duty to represent the client fully within the framework of the law. The
second situation-making known to the court an applicable appellate deci-
sion-is a very different matter. The attorney must reveal such a decision
to the court even at the expense of his client because to do otherwise is to
pervert the system: A question of determining the applicable law is in-
volved, and there is no obligation to the client to withhold knowledge of
the applicable law. The attorney's obligation is to present the applicable,
or possibly applicable, law to the court. This is not to say that the lawyer
should not do his best to distinguish precedent or even advocate the over-
ruling of prior law. While his obligation is to represent his client fully in
obtaining a determination of the law, to conceal the law would be to distort
the judicial process which relies upon stare decisis as a cornerstone.3 3 This
obligation to report controlling law, of course, does not extend to any
21 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 146 (1935).
2Id.
o Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STN. L. REv. 3, 11 (1951).
See In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46 (1954) (attorney's duty to inform court of
adverse decisions not limited to controlling authorities); ABA COMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs,
OPINIONS, No. 280 (1949) (attorney's duty to inform the court of adverse decisions). Cf. The
Attorney's Duties of Disclosure, 31 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 283 (1957) (attorney has obligation to
expose perjury as well as to disclose adverse authority). But see Tunstall, Ethics in Citations:
A Plea for Re-Interpretation of a Canon, 35 A.B.A.J. 5 (1949), in which the author asserts
that the obligation to disclose adverse authority should be narrowly defined and should
extend only so far as the authority is controlling.
32 If, however, a controlling decision had held that the names of all witnesses must be dis-
closed by either party, then it would no longer be a matter of fact, but of law, and the lawyer
would then be under a positive obligation to reveal the name of the witness as well as the
controlling authority in the case.
See generally Re, Stare Decisis and the Judicial Process, 22 CATH. LAW. 38 (1976).
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obligation to advance new theories on behalf of the other party to the
lawsuit.34 Such an obligation would be an abandonment of the adversary
system and must therefore be rejected.
As a final note, it is important for the lawyer to remember his great
freedom in challenging any "settled" line of decisions. It has been the
courage of a few daring lawyers that has led to some fundamental legal
breakthroughs in our society. In important questions, the conscientious
lawyer must be prepared to challenge the law with courage for the sake of
justice. He then can address the court: "If such has been the law, from
the standpoint of justice it should not have been; if it is the law now, it
will not be hereafter." As the public servant of justice, that moment
does proud to any lawyer. 6
m ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 280 (1949).
u Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d 731, 734
(1952).
" Historically, the bench and bar have been much more interested in conserving established
case law than in modernizing legal doctrine. Whether this is due to an instinctive distrust of
anything new which could jeopardize the entrenched position of the legal profession or to a
legitimate conserving force in society is difficult to determine.
